

HyResponse

# BASICS OF HYDROGEN SAFETY FOR FIRST RESPONDERS

Lecture. Hazards of hydrogen use indoors



# Content

- Objectives of the lecture
- Hazards of hydrogen use indoors
- Passive and forced ventilation
- Regimes of indoor jet fires:
  - Well ventilated
  - Under ventilated
    - Self-extinction
    - External flame
- Pressure peaking phenomenon

# Objectives of the lecture


- Identify the main hazards of hydrogen use indoors
- Distinguish between passive and forced ventilation
- Describe the main regimes on hydrogen indoor fires
- Understand the effect of deflagration venting
- Explain pressure peaking phenomenon
- Use nomograms to evaluate the possibility of pressure peaking phenomenon

# Hazards of hydrogen use indoors

- Oxygen depletion and asphyxiation
- Effects of high temperature and heat flux from jet fires
- Overpressure effects
- Structural collapse
- “Domino” effects
- Damage to environment
- Injury and loss of life





# Hydrogen phenomena and consequences



Please see HyIndoor Guidelines for more details:

# Natural vs. passive ventilation



**Natural ventilation** equations for air ventilation are derived in the assumption of **equality** of flow in and out (**neutral plane is at half vent height**).


**Passive ventilation**: neutral plane for lighter than air gases can be anywhere below half of vent height.

# Safety implications

Difference:

$$X = f(X) \cdot \left[ \frac{Q_0}{C_D A (g' H)^{1/2}} \right]^{2/3}$$

$$f(X) = \left( \frac{9}{8} \right)^{1/3} \cdot \left\{ \left[ 1 - X \left( 1 - \frac{\rho_{H_2}}{\rho_{air}} \right) \right]^{1/3} + (1 - X)^{2/3} \right\}$$



**Natural ventilation equation should not be used:**

- Underestimate by **x2 (lean)**
- Overestimate by **x2 (rich)**


# Ventilation nomogram

- The nomogram is developed by UU to calculate the maximum concentration for sustained hydrogen leak in an enclosure with one vent. Allows to calculate:
  - Steady-state hydrogen uniform concentration for the given release rate ( $Q$ ) and vent size ( $H \times W$ ).
  - Parameters of the vent to get desired concentration for the given release rate.
  - The release rate to get desired concentration for the given vent sizes.





# Nomogram ( $C_{\max}$ steady-state)



## Calculation examples:

- Release rate (1 g/s)
- Vent Height (1 m)
- Vent width (1 m)
- Function curve
- Concentration (7%)

1. RCS require no more than 2% v/v (50% LFL)
2. For the same 1x1 m vent release rate  $Q < 0.2 \text{ g/s}$


# Hydrogen jet fire indoor

- Important to understand for practical applications.
- Behaviour of fire depends on the release conditions and geometry of an enclosure/ventilation.
- Well-ventilated and under-ventilated fires.

# Jet fire from a TPRD of a FC car in a garage

Size of a small garage LxWxH=4.5x2.6x2.6 m (with a “brick”-sized vent).

Mass flow rate: **390 g/s (350 bar,  $D=5.08$  mm, today cars)**



# Indoor hydrogen fires

## Two regimes of indoor fires:

- Well-ventilated: sufficient amount of oxygen (from the air) for complete combustion of hydrogen inside an enclosure
- Under-ventilated: insufficient amount of oxygen (from the air) to burn hydrogen completely





# Jet fires: numerical experiments

Seven numerical experiments with a single vent were performed (a FC-like enclosure  $L \times W \times H = 1 \times 1 \times 1$  m; vertical upward release of hydrogen from 5 mm pipe with exit 10 cm above the floor centre; a single vent located centrally at the top of one wall):

No.	Vent size, HxW	Velocity, m/s	Flow rate, g/s	Result
1	Horizontal 3x30 cm	600 m/s	1.0857	Self-extinction
2	Horizontal 3x30 cm	300 m/s	0.5486	Self-extinction
3	Horizontal 3x30 cm	150 m/s	0.2714	External flame
4	Vertical 30x3 cm	600 m/s	1.0857	External flame
5	Vertical 30x3 cm	60 m/s	0.1086	Well ventilated
6	Vertical 13.9x3 cm	600 m/s	1.0857	Self-extinction
7	Vertical 13.9x3 cm	300 m/s	0.5486	External flame

# Well-ventilated fire (1/2)



No.5: vertical vent 30x3 cm; release 60 m/s - 0.11 g/s.





# Well-ventilated fire (2/2)

No.5: vertical vent 30x3 cm; release 60 m/s - 0.11 g/s.



# Simulation videos

## Well-ventilated fire:

[No.5](#) (vertical vent 30x3 cm; release 60 m/s, 0.11 g/s) - OH

[No.5](#) – Temperature (70 C – “no harm” temperature)

## Under-ventilated fire (two modes):

### Self-extinction mode:

[No.6](#) (vertical vent 13.9x3 cm, 600 m/s) – Temperature

[No.6](#) – OH

### External flame mode:

[No.7](#) (vertical vent 13.9x3 cm, 300 m/s) – OH


[No.4](#) (vertical vent 30x3 cm, 600 m/s) – Temperature





# Why two modes?


## External flame (No.4)



Vertical 30x3 cm

600 m/s

## Self-extinction (No.2)



Horizontal 3x30 cm

300 m/s

# Self-extinction of jet fire in a 1 m<sup>3</sup> box

- Calculation domain hexahedron;  $L \times W \times H = 7 \times 6 \times 4$  m.
- Cubical enclosure  $L \times W \times H = 1 \times 1 \times 1$  m.
- One horizontal vent  $H \times W = 0.03 \times 0.3$  m under the ceiling (“tracer box”). The vent size is calculated to ensure no air ingress after self-extinction, and that pressure peaking (unignited) is below 1 kPa.
- Mass flow rate 1 g/s (50 kW fuel cell).
- Release from a pipe of 5.08 mm diameter located 10cm above the floor.
- Box has aluminium walls of thickness 20 mm



# Hydrogen indoor fire regimes

The general rule for indoor fire with one upper vent is as follows. The increase of hydrogen release flow rate changes fire regime from:

- well-ventilated fire (small leak rates), to
- under-ventilated fire with external flame (moderate flow rates), to
- under-ventilated fire with self-extinction of combustion (higher flow rates), and again to
- under-ventilated fire with external flame (very high flow rates)



# Vented deflagrations


- ❖ Vented deflagration is based on a limiting of pressure build-up within an enclosure through the release of burned and unburned mixtures through a vent.
- ❖ If no venting is provided, the maximum pressures developed during the deflagration are typically 6 to 10 times higher than the initial absolute pressure.
- ❖ This is the most effective mitigation techniques for deflagrations. It is discussed in more detail in the Lecture 'Dealing with hydrogen explosions'.



# Overlooked safety issue

- **Problem:** Hydrogen-powered car is in a **closed garage** of 44 m<sup>3</sup> free volume. Release from an onboard storage through a PRD of 5.08 mm diameter at pressure 350 bar gives mass flow rate 390 g/s (volumetric flow rate is  $390/2 \cdot 0.0224 = \mathbf{4.4 \text{ m}^3/\text{s}}$ ).
- **Consequences:** Every second of non-reacting release, pressure in the garage will increase by  $(44+4.4)/44=1.1$  times, i.e. on 10 kPa. Civil building structures can withstand 10-20 kPa.  
**Thus, in 1-2 s the garage “is gone”.**

# Pressure peaking phenomenon



$$V_{vent} = CA \left\{ \left( \frac{2\gamma}{\gamma-1} \right) \frac{P_s}{\rho_{encl}} \left[ \left( \frac{P_s}{P_{encl}} \right)^{\frac{2}{\gamma}} - \left( \frac{P_s}{P_{encl}} \right)^{\frac{\gamma+1}{\gamma}} \right] \right\}^{\frac{1}{2}}$$


**Garage:** 4.5x2.6x2.6 m with a “brick” vent.

**Car:** mass flow rate 390 g/s (H<sub>2</sub>: 350 bar, 5.08 mm orifice).

Definition: it is a transient peak in the pressure dynamics during hydrogen release in enclosures with vent(s) (Brennan and Molkov, 2013).


**Solution:** decrease TPRD diameter (increase fire resistance of tank).

# Pressure peaking phenomenon: step 1 of 2





# Pressure peaking phenomenon: step 2 of 2



The nomogram use:

1) Pressure  $p=700$  bar;  
Orifice diameter  $D=5$  mm  
Vent size area  $A$   
 $0.07\text{m} \times 0.3\text{m} = 0.021 \text{ m}^2$   
Overpressure 60 kPa

2) Overpressure 8 kPa below  
the limit for structures.

Then the venting area in a  
garage should be  $A=0.1 \text{ m}^2$ , e.g.  
about  $0.3\text{m} \times 0.32\text{m}$  ( $0.1\text{m} \times 1\text{m}$ ).

Garages in cold climate zones  
would not have such large vent  
area (and thus would be  
destroyed).

**Non-reacting releases.**



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